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ABSTRACT 
 
Author:   Eleni S. Demeris 
 
Title:   The Financialization of Food: Why Dinner Got So Political Last Night  
 
Supervising Professors:   J. David Miller, Bartholomew H. Sparrow  
 
 
This thesis explores the effects of the financialization of food on agricultural commodity 
markets. The financialization of food refers to the surge in commodity derivatives trading by 
financial traders that followed the 2000 deregulation of commodity markets. Most existing 
literature discusses this financialization in regard to the 2008 food price crisis, as some believe 
this surge in agricultural commodity investment caused the sharp food price spikes in 2008. A 
literary analysis of existing scholarship surrounding commodity investment’s role in the food 
price crisis is performed, with the resulting findings leading to conclusions on the effects of the 
financialization on agricultural derivative markets. This paper finds that the increased investment 
in agricultural commodity derivatives that followed the 2000 deregulation of commodity trading 
negatively affected agricultural commodity markets by facilitating the emergence of a highly 
politicized market. In order to address these negative effects, regulation is purposed that hopes to 
ease the political tensions within agricultural commodity markets.      
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
	  “How Wall Street Starved Million and Got Away with It,” a bold headline that would 
make any casual magazine reader stop, cock their head to the side, and contemplate reading the 
succeeding article.1 Being that reader, I decided the headline hooked me enough to read on. The 
article that followed explained a theory where the actions of Wall Street investors drove up food 
prices so high, that they pushed millions of people in developing countries into poverty and 
hunger. Astonished by the possibility that this might have actually happened, further inquiry 
ensued, leading to the discovery of the theory that the financialization of food caused the 2008 
food price crisis, which drove over 40 million people into hunger.2 The financialization of food 
refers to the surge in commodity derivatives trading by financial traders that followed the 2000 
legislation that deregulated commodity trading, opening up investment opportunities. Because of 
the implications of this theory, much research has occurred over the past decade to determine its 
validity. This research has focused primarily on testing to prove a causal link between the 
financialization and food prices increases, as well as creating theoretical frameworks to describe 
this link. While this paper will also look at the influence of the financialization of food, it will 
instead look at its influence on agricultural commodity markets as a whole, rather than focusing 
on its specific role in the food price crisis. However, because the food price crisis is the focal 
point of existing literature, the food price crisis will be the launching point of this analysis. 
Specifically, this study seeks to answer the following question: Has the financialization of food 
that followed the 2000 commodity trading deregulation negatively affected agricultural 
commodity markets? And, if so, how can we address these negative consequences?  
																																																						
1 Frederick Kaufman, "The Food Bubble: How Wall Street Starved Millions and Got Away with It," Harper's 
Magazine, July 2010, 1.  
2 "Number of Hungry People Rises to 963 Million," Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 
December 9, 2010. 
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This paper will proceed by first discussing the background of both agricultural 
commodity markets and the food price crisis, in order to provide context for the subsequent 
literary analysis. Next, a discussion of the analysis methods used will set up the analysis section 
to follow. The literary analysis will proceed chronologically, with thematic distinctions within 
each time period. Finally, findings, leading to both conclusions and recommendations, will 
follow based on the preformed analysis.    
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Chapter 2: Background 
The use of commodity futures contracts and speculation in agricultural derivatives is a 
practice that has an ancient history. Speculation in agricultural derivatives can be seen in 
Aristotle’s Politics, when Aristotle tells the story of Thales the Milesian, a philosopher who grew 
tired of being ridiculed because he lived in poverty. Because of Thales’ high level 
meteorological knowledge he was able to anticipate a more bountiful olive harvest for the 
upcoming period. As a result, he hired all the oil presses in the area for the time of the harvest, 
and the press owners were more than happy to sell him these rights for the exchange of 
immediate cash. When the abundant harvest materialized, Thales thus exercised his “option” and 
became a wealthy man as a result.3  
The world’s first organized futures market was the trade of rice futures at the Dojima 
Exchange, used by Japanese samurai in the 1700s. This market was created because of rice 
prices falling to a record low in the early 1700s affecting the income of samurai (whose income 
was tied to rice prices) causing them to fall to the income level of the merchant class, who’s 
growing power worried the nation’s elites. As a result, the government allowed for the trading of 
these futures contracts to aid in maintaining rice prices, and thus, retaining elite power.4  
The Dojima Exchange is the first example of a market that has become integral to the 
modern economy for producers, consumers, and investors. Before discussing the evolution of 
these agricultural financial derivatives in the United States, it is important to briefly describe 
how these different derivatives work.  
																																																						
3 Aristotle, Politics, 2nd. ed. (n.p.: University of Chicago Press, 2013). 
4  David A. Moss and Eugene Kintgen, The Dojima Rice Market and the Origins of Futures Trading, report no. 9-
709-044, Leadership and Managing People (n.p.: Harvard Business School, 2010) 
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Introduction to Agricultural Commodity Trading 
Types of Agricultural Financial Derivatives 
 Many of the investors in food commodities today have no interest in taking possession of 
any physical commodities, yet the behavior of their investments are still heavily linked to what is 
happening with the physical trade of food.5 While many smaller investors only operate on this 
level removed from the physical commodity, the most powerful investors, the agri-food 
companies, trade these derivatives, physical commodities, and operate from the farm level all the 
way through manufacturing.  
 The oldest and most common form of commodity derivatives used by investors and 
speculators are futures contracts, which are standardized contracts to buy or sell an asset on or 
before a specific date, set in the future, at a specific price set in the contract. In the United States 
these contracts are standardized and cleared through an exchange, like the CME Group. Futures 
options, a contract giving the right to buy or sell a futures contract, but not an obligation, are also 
traded on exchanges. Also, traded on exchanges are commodity exchange traded funds 
(commodity ETF) which are products that track an index, like the Goldman Sachs Commodity 
Index, and can be backed by either a single commodity held in physical storage, or, more 
commonly backed by different types of derivatives.  
 The above products are commonly traded on exchanges, and thus subject to more 
transparency and more stringent regulation than products sold over-the-counter (OTC), meaning 
traded and negotiated privately without being cleared through an exchange. Commodity index 
funds (CIFs) are investment products that track the prices of a bundle of commodities, and are 
constructed/managed to perform like the stated index. These are typically comprised of 15-30 
																																																						
5 Jennifer Clapp, David Burch, and Sophia Murphy, "Cereal Secrets: The World's Largest Grain Traders and Global 
Agriculture," Oxfam Research Reports, August 2012, 6. 
	 11 
percent agricultural commodities, with the rest being commodities like minerals and oil. The 
most popular products are the Goldman Sachs Commodity Index (GSCI), the Bloomberg 
Commodity Index, and the Dow Jones USB index. While banks sell these products, other 
companies, including the major agri-food companies also sell products based on these indices. 
Most CIFs are sold over-the-counter.6 Also typically arranged OTC, are commodity swaps, a 
contract where two sides agree to exchange cash flows dependent on the underlying value of a 
commodity. Most commonly, the floating (market or spot) price based on the underlying 
commodity is traded for a fixed payment stipulated in the contract as an interest rate swap. This 
is used to hedge against falls in the price of the commodity. Both sides of the swap can also be 
commodity based. Lastly, another popular OTC product is a commodity-linked note (CLN). 
CLNs are debt securities whose payout generally depends on the performance of a certain 
commodity index. The structure of CLNs vary per the issuer, but generally they do not pay 
interest, and the investor will receive a percentage of the principle upon maturity, plus additional 
return based on a contracted formula that depends on a commodity index. These notes are 
designed for investors that are willing to forgo market rates of interest.7  
 Trading Information   
The products discussed above that are cleared on exchanges can be found on exchanges 
both in the United States, and internationally. The most popular include the CME Group, which 
was formed by the 2007 merger of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange and the Chicago Board of 
Trade, the Intercontinental Exchange, the Kansas City Board of Trade, and Minneapolis Grain 
Exchange, all of which are located in the United States. It is also important to note that on both 
																																																						
6 Ibid., 59.  
7  Securities and Exchange Commission, Bank of America Commodity Linked Notes Pricing Supplement (n.p., 
2008). 
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exchange and OTC facilitated trades, two different types of prices can be quoted, spot and 
futures prices. A commodity’s spot prices are the price at which the commodity could be traded 
at any given time in the market place, where a futures prices is a commodity’s price in relation to 
the spot price, time till delivery, storage costs, and risk-free interest rate.  
 The U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CTFC) requires traders to be 
identified as either commercial or non-commercial traders in order to identify whether a 
particular trader is hedging, mitigating risk, or speculating, betting on market direction to make a 
profit. These labels have important market regulation consequences, leading to much debate 
surrounding the issue. Often the idea of a growing resemblance between agri-food companies 
and investment banks fuels this debate, a topic that will be discussed later.8 With an 
understanding of the structure of the different agricultural commodity derivatives, one then 
wonders the reasoning for such investments.  
Motives for Agricultural Commodity Investment  
Investors primarily include commodities in their investment portfolios because they are 
relatively uncorrelated with returns of traditional asset classes, this being partly attributable to 
inflation. An increased demand for goods and services, and therefore rising inflation, usually 
implies increased demand for the commodities used to produce those goods and services, leading 
to commodity returns.9 Agricultural commodities are especially attractive because of the safety 
and scarcity around them. The safety results from the inflation hedge and the ability to duck 
deteriorating conditions in traditional equity and debt markets, which explains why there was an 
increased flow of investments into agricultural commodity funds at the bust of the dot com 
																																																						
8 James W. Williams, "Feeding Finance: A Critical Account of the Shifting Relationships between Finance, Food 
and Farming," Economy and Society 43, no. 3 (2014): 425. 
9 Hans R. Stoll and Robert E. Whaley, "Commodity Index Investing and Commodity Futures Prices," Journal of 
Applied Finance, no. 1 (2010): 9. 
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bubble as well as during the demise of the sub-prime market.10 Agriculture is also valued for 
scarcity because of increasing population growth combined with decreasing productive 
farmland.11   
 Sellers and buyers of the physical commodities benefit from the use of futures markets by 
locking in prices and hedging their risk through futures contracts purchased by investors. Futures 
markets were initially created to allow for such price stability.   
 Unlike hedgers, speculators are motivated by the possibility of making a profit basing 
their analysis on market fundamentals, especially the supply and demand of a specific 
commodity. This type of speculation is seen as necessary in markets in order to allow for price 
discovery, aiding farmers and buyers in discovering a reasonable price for the commodity.12 The 
effectiveness of this practice is up for debate due to the growing influence of agri-food 
companies on both sides of this process and will be discussed in a later section. 
History of the Regulation of Agricultural Commodity Derivatives in the US 
1922-2000: Regulatory Beginnings and The Movement to Deregulation  
 US agricultural futures markets have been regulated since the Grain Futures Act of 1922, 
which only allowed futures trading to take place on approved exchanges required to outlaw 
manipulation of cornering of the market. Since 1923, large traders, meaning traders holding over 
25 contracts, have been required to report daily market positions.13 The 1936 US Commodity 
Exchange Act gave federal regulators the ability to establish position limits on non-commercial 
investors, those that are not bona fide hedgers, but rather speculators. Since 1974, the CTFC has 
																																																						
10 Williams, "Feeding Finance," 404. 
11 Ibid.  
12 United Nations, Food Commodities Speculation and Food Price Crisis: Regulation to Reduce the Risks of Price 
Volatility, by Oliver De Schutter, issue brief no. 2 (n.p., 2010), 3. 
13 Jennifer Clapp and Eric Helleiner, "Troubled Futures? The Global Food Crisis and the Politics of Agricultural 
Derivatives Regulation," Review of International Political Economy 19, no. 2 (2010): 186. 
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maintained regulatory supervision of commodity futures markets, including this monitoring of 
position limits.14  
 While the above regulations were established to prevent market manipulation and sharp 
price shifts, the landscape began to change as financial deregulation began in the early 1980s and 
continued through the 1990s. This deregulation allowed entry for new financial players on 
commodity exchanges, especially through the 2000 Commodity Futures Modernization Act 
(CFMA).15 The relaxation of regulations at the end of the 20th century became codified through 
the CFMA by exempting OTC derivative trade from CFTC oversight. The sale of OTC 
derivatives was essentially unregulated, bringing the US more in line with the commodity trading 
practices of other countries.16 In the years following the passage of the CFMA much change 
continued in commodity markets.  
2000-2008: Commodity Markets Evolution Pre-Food Price Crisis 
 Between 2003 and mid-2008, the total value of speculative instruments in commodity 
indexes increased over tenfold from $15 billion to $200 billion.17 Around the end of this five-
year timeframe, commodity ETFs began to grow in popularity. Retail investors now had access 
to commodity markets, and the efforts of the sellers of these products offset their exposure to the 
products they sold, in turn generating greater demand for agricultural futures.18 In the years 
2006-2008, between 30-50 percent of all the outstanding purchases of wheat futures on the CME 
were the result of purchases by index traders offsetting some exposure to commodity index 
																																																						
14 Jennifer Clapp, "The Financialization of Food: Who Is Being Fed?" (paper presented at International Society for 
Ecological Economics Conference, Rio De Janeiro, Brazil, June 2012), 4. 
15 Jayati Ghosh, "The Unnatural Coupling: Food and Global Finance," Journal of Agrarian Change 10, no. 1 
(January 2010): 77-78. 
16 Clapp, "The Financialization," 5. 
17 Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Excessive Speculation in the Wheat Market, S. , at 171 (D.C. 2009), 
5. 
18 Clapp and Helleiner, "Troubled Futures?," 188. 
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products sold to third parties.19 The CTFC continued to relax relegations during this time period 
responding to pressure from index traders by allowing position limits to be waived for a couple 
financial institutions, approved index funds that passed price risks to customers, pension funds, 
and other institutional investors diversifying their risk through commodities.20 As interest in 
agricultural derivatives grew, food prices seemed to follow a similar path.  
The Food Price Crisis of 2008 
 In order to understand the agricultural commodity regulation after 2008, one must 
understand the food price crisis due to its major role in shaping such legislation. Beginning in 
late 2005, the markets of different agricultural commodities experienced increasing prices and 
volatility levels.21 Food prices rose by 83 percent between 2005 and 2008, with the price of corn 
tripling, wheat prices increasing by 127 percent, and rice prices increasing by 170 percent.22 The 
implied volatilities, the markets expectations on the extent the price of the commodity will 
change in the future, of wheat, soy, and corn all rose steadily from 2005 until 2008, with this 
increase continuing for corn into 2009.23 This surge in food prices resulted in the number of 
people living in extreme poverty worldwide to raise by 130 to 150 million people 24, with at least 
40 million being pushed into hunger.25  Amidst this food price spike, the Food and Agriculture 
Organization released a report indicating that basic supply and demand fundamentals could not 
explain the sharp increase in food prices due to the large upswings in implied volatility during 
																																																						
19 Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Excessive Speculation in the Wheat Market, S. , at 171 (D.C. 2009), 
2. 
20 Clapp and Helleiner, "Troubled Futures?," 188. 
21 Ghosh, "The Unnatural," 76. 
22 Christopher L. Gilbert, "Speculative Influences on Commodity Futures Prices 2006-2008," in United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development Discussion Papers (n.p., 2010). 
23 United Nations, Food Commodities, 2. 
24 Andrew Burns, Global Economic Prospects: Commodities at the Crossroads(Washington, DC: International Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank, 2009), 96. 
25 "Number of Hungry People Rises to 963 Million," Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 
December 9, 2010. 
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this time.26 Currently there is debate surrounding whether or not these price increases were a 
result of excessive speculation in commodity market derivatives, or a result of general 
unfavorable factors affecting food supply.27 While this debate will be discussed in a later section, 
it is important to note that the general belief in the time immediately following the price crisis 
was that supply and demand fundamentals are insufficient for complete explanation of the food 
price crisis, and that while they played a role, a number of signs imply that a significant portion 
of the price spike was a consequence of the emergence of a speculative bubble.28 
 Just prior to their bankruptcy, the Lehman Brothers found that the volume of index fund 
speculation had increased by 1,900 percent from January 2003-March 2008,29 with holdings in 
commodity index funds growing from $13 billion or $317 billion in the same time period.30 
Morgan Stanley also estimates that the number of open interest corn futures contracts increased 
from 500,000 to 2,500,000 in the same time period.31  
This agricultural speculative bubble burst when giant non-traditional traders could no 
longer fund the permanent long potions as a result of their investments in other markets crashing, 
causing the fast growing food spike to end.32 Price spikes then returned in 2010 and years 
following resulting in decreased food security for the world’s poorest people.33 The food price 
																																																						
26  Food Outlook: Global Market Analysis (n.p.: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 
2008), 55-57. 
27 United Nations, Food Commodities, 2. 
28 Ibid., 3., Clapp and Helleiner, "Troubled Futures?," 189., Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, “Excessive 
Speculation,”9., Ghosh, "The Unnatural," 74., Trade and Development Report, 2009 (Geneva: United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development, 2009)., Commodities Market Speculation: The Risk to Food Security and 
Agriculture(n.p.: Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy, 2008).  
29 Peter Whal, Food Speculation: The Main Factor of the Price Bubble in 2008(n.p.: World Economy, Ecology, and 
Development, 2009), 11. 
30 Frederick Kaufman, "The Food Bubble: How Wall Street Starved Millions and Got Away with It," Harper's 
Magazine, July 2010, 32. 
31 Thomas Lines, Speculation in Food Commodity Markets (n.p.: World Development Movement, 2010), 1. 
32 United Nations, Food Commodities, 6. 
33 Jennifer Clapp, "Financialization, Distance and Global Food Politics" (paper presented at Food Sovereignty: A 
Critical Dialogue international conference, Yale University, New Haven, CT, September 2013), 14. 
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crisis of 2008 allowed flaws in agricultural derivatives markets to surface and brought them to 
the center of policy discussion. The 2009 Senate report found that just six traders held as much 
as 60 percent of the long open interest of the of CME Group wheat futures contracts attributable 
to index traders, leading to the worry that small changes in portfolio management of these 
investors could have a significant impact on agricultural prices.34 There was also worry about the 
emergence of large price-insensitive investors consuming liquidity by purchasing and constantly 
rolling futures positions, undermining price discovery efforts.35 Also leaving little room for price 
discovery was the increasing vertical integration of major agri-food companies.36 The 
materialization of such flaws led to an increase in government regulation. 
The Dodd-Frank Act 
 The passage of the Dodd-Frank Act on financial reform in 2010 had specific regulatory 
consequences for agricultural derivative trading. The Dodd-Frank Act required that most OTC 
swaps be cleared through a clearing house and traded on exchanges, the CTFC to establish limits 
on the number of agricultural commodities that can be held by a single trader and on the 
positions of contracts based on the same underlying commodity by a single trader, and gave the 
CTFC the authority to impose capital and margin requirements on swap dealers and major 
participants.37 Soon after the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act large financial institutions, and 
especially major agri-food companies, like Cargill and Archer Daniels Midland, began to make 
their opposing views heard surrounding the new legislation. In the two years following the bill’s 
passage, over 25 meetings were scheduled between the CTFC and the four largest agri-food 
																																																						
34 Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, “Excessive Speculation,” 106. 
35 Clapp and Helleiner, "Troubled Futures?," 189. 
36 Clapp, Burch, and Murphy, "Cereal Secrets," 11. 
37 Ibid., 33., United Nations, Food Commodities, 6. 
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companies to discuss the bill.38 Trading firms also submitted letters and testified in congressional 
hearings.39  
Central to these concerns over the legislation, was the new positions limits rule. These 
concerns stemmed from not only the new limits to be set on agricultural commodities, but also 
first time limits on energy and metal commodity markets. When the CFTC revealed the purposed 
limits, and per protocol opened the proposal to public comments, they were flooded with over 
15,000 comment letters claiming that the agency had not provided convincing evidence that 
excess speculation drove up commodity prices, and that thus such position limits were necessary.    
The efforts of both the trading institutions and the writers of letters paid off when on September 
28, 2012 when a district court judge vacated the position limits rule. This ruling was primarily 
based off a single econometric test, Granger causality, which failed to show a direct causal 
relationship between excessive speculation subsequent commodity price movements.40 
Moreover, this position limits rule is still up in the air, as the CFTC has floated coming to a new 
limits rule that would follow the court’s ruling as well as suffice the Dodd-Frank provision. With 
a new appointed CFTC chairman, many questions currently exist surround the future of this rule.  
The September 2012 court ruling, focusing on the Granger-causality test used in making the 
decision, has brought the issue of appropriate econometric tests to assess the causality between 
financial speculation and commodity prices to the forefront of the reliability of empirical testing 
results. The outcome of this court case has some worried that some groups might be over relying 
on econometric/empirical tests to draw conclusions about issues whose complexity might surpass 
the testing being used. Issues, such as the dispute over the inability of econometric tests to 
																																																						
38 www.cftc.gov 
39 Clapp, Burch, and Murphy, "Cereal Secrets," 33. 
40 James W. Williams and Nikolai M. Cook, "Econometrics as Evidence? Examining the 'Causal' Connections 
between Financial Speculation and Commodities Prices," Social Studies of Science 46, no. 5 (2016): 702. 
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accurately depict complex markets, plays a role in the current debate over the drivers of the food 
price crisis.     
Current Debate Over the Driver for the Increase in Commodity Prices 
 Evidence has been presented that tests like Granger causality are not sufficient for full 
examination of this casual connection between speculation and increasing prices.41 Much of the 
current research is looking at different models and ways of examining this causal connection in 
order to appropriately regulate this area of investments. These models are looking at 
informational fictions within markets and shocks that are unobservable to market participants to 
explain the connection between commodity market activity and the increasing food prices.42 
These models will be the basis of the theoretical framework discussed in subsequent chapters and 
used in discussing possible policy solutions. Policy solutions are often centered around US 
regulation, as due to the influence the US has on international agricultural commodity markets.  
Agricultural Commodity Influencers 
The United States  
 US commodity derivatives markets have global influence, resulting in the CTFC being a 
de facto global regulator for commodity derivatives, making the US the central player in the 
agricultural commodity market. This role became apparent following the 2008 price crisis when 
the US was able to convince other countries to tighten their regulation surround commodity 
derivatives markets.43 The US influence can be especially seen following the passage of the 
Dodd-Frank Act, which encouraged the foreign regulators to establish comparable position limits 
																																																						
41 Ibid.,714-19. 
42  Michael Sockin and Wei Xiong, "Informational Friction and Commodity Markets," The Journal of Finance 70, 
no. 5 (2015)., Kenneth J. Singleton, "Investor Flows and the 2008 Boom/Bust in Oil Prices," Management 
Science 60, no. 2 (2014)., James D. Hamilton and Jing Cynthia Wu, "Effects of Index-Fund Investing on 
Commodity Futures Prices," International Economic Review 56, no. 1 (February 2015). 
43 Clapp and Helleiner, "Troubled Futures?," 192. 
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as those in the US and foreign regulators were willing to coordinate with the CFTC to develop 
international standards surrounding swaps and commodity futures regulation.44 The United 
States is also home to the world’s largest derivatives exchange, CME Group, as well as the 
fourth largest derivatives exchange, the Intercontinental Exchange, making its regulations 
internationally prevalent.45 The United States’ global significance through exchange size as well 
as being an international regulation influencer is the reason policy surrounding the US 
commodity trading is the center of this paper, as well as many other papers exploring this topic. 
While the US might be geographically the center of much discussion surrounding agricultural 
derivatives, it is also important to note the key traders that influence much of the regulation 
surrounding agricultural commodity derivatives.   
 Major Agri-Food Companies 
 Often referred to as the ABCD companies, are the four largest agri-food companies that 
are not only the major traders of commodity derivatives, but also hold a significant presence in 
the control of basic commodities, controlling, for example, as much as 90 percent of the global 
grain trade.46 These companies, Archer Daniels Midland (ADM), Bunge, Cargill, and Louis 
Dreyfus, have been around for over 100 years, having long played a role in agricultural 
commodity markets. These firms have an information advantage when trading due to their initial 
business being in food processing, and later getting into the financial services business.47 Having 
this informational advantage is unique to commodity trading, as is it “the only major US market 
where companies are allowed to act on inside information to manage risks other might not know 
																																																						
44 Ibid., 194. 
45  Futures Industry Association, "Largest Derivatives Exchanges Worldwide in 2015, by Number of Contracts 
Traded (in Millions)," in Statista. 
46 Clapp, Burch, and Murphy, "Cereal Secrets," 3. 
47 Clapp, "The Financialization," 6. 
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about.”48 These firms operate on the input, trading, processing, and retail levels of agricultural 
commodity markets, but the growing importance of financial risk management has elevated this 
area to a core part of their business structure as well as a major source of revenue.49 The ABCD 
firms not only can trade on their own information to generate revenue, but also package their 
own financial products to sell to investors, resulting in 12 different financial service divisions 
among these four companies that have continued to grow in recent years.50  
 
          
	 	
																																																						
48 Ann Davis, "Cargill's Inside View Helps It Buck Downturn," The Wall Street Journal, January 14, 2009. 
49 Clapp, "The Financialization," 7., Clapp, Burch, and Murphy, "Cereal Secrets," 8. 
50 Clapp, Burch, and Murphy, "Cereal Secrets," 27-9. 
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
 In order to explore the question of “Has the financialization of food that followed the 
deregulation of commodity trading negatively affected agricultural markets? And, if so, how can 
we address the negative consequences?” I analyzed different types of literature to draw 
conclusions that would hopefully lead to an answer. Because the 2008 food price crisis initiated 
the discussion surrounding the effects of the deregulation of commodity trading that 
subsequently increased the volume of agricultural commodity derivative investment, due to the 
belief that this activity might have been a primary driver for the food price spikes, the majority of 
this analysis will focus on literature that followed the crisis.  
 The primary critique of the financialization of food, has been the theory that because 
market fundamentals could not explain the food price spikes in 2008, there must have been an 
alternative driver. The increased investment and speculation in commodity futures markets 
quickly became a popular way to try and describe these spikes. Because the food price spikes 
drove tens of millions of people into huger and extreme poverty, the idea that people on Wall 
Street could be driving the spikes made it a much more attractive area to both research and write 
about in popular press. This encouraged academics, journalists, regulators, and those in the 
industry to explore the area.  
 While more recent scholarship has looked beyond the narrow focus of looking at whether 
or not increased commodity investment caused the food price crisis, the vast majority of research 
has made the increased speculation causing price increases question the focal point of their work, 
making it the primary launch point for my own analysis.51 In addition to being a launch point, 
research surround this causation question has become my primary avenue for assessing the 
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impact of financialization on agricultural markets, as this allows for a specific way for looking at 
this issue.  
 In addition to the academic popularity of the idea that the financialization of agriculture 
could have driven up food prices, the policy implications of this theory made it an attractive and 
effective area to focus research. Because agricultural commodity investments are under 
regulatory oversight, problems usually begin and end with some regulatory issue. In the case of 
agricultural commodities, the deregulation legislation of 2000 that triggered increased 
investment, which might have resulted in the food price spikes, lead to subsequent policy 
reactions to try and prevent repetition of such extreme food price spikes in the future. Analysis of 
what influenced the resulting policy, as well as analysis of the policy itself will also aid in 
judging the impact of the increased investment in agricultural commodities.  
 The analysis of literature focuses on three major providers of research: governing bodies 
and the organizations that influenced their policy, academic research, and popular literature. The 
work that came in the aftermath of the food price crisis and the more recent research for each 
area has been looked at separately due to the differing trends in each period. Additionally, other 
distinctions were made, such as theoretical versus empirical research, given that these different 
approaches gave different and conflicting results.     
In examining the literature, there were numerous factors that I focused on to draw 
conclusions surrounding the impact of increased investment in agriculture. Throughout the 
research process of the thesis, the factors by which I analyzed each source morphed as I realized 
the highly political nature of commodity markets. Because this realization altered the direction of 
the thesis, rather than simply analyzing sources to see whether their causation findings were 
valid and if there had been policy as a result of these findings, I began to think about the 
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motivations of the author of each source, alternatives to the idea that conflicting results were 
simply because of the use of different econometrics tests, and the possibility of hidden agendas 
in these works. Additionally, I placed a greater focus on popular journalism that most other 
works in this area, to get a sense of the public perception of the food price crisis and commodity 
trading deregulation, as the general public’s primary source of information on this topic comes 
through popular press. While each type of literature required a slightly different type of analysis, 
due to their differing natures in structure, inputs, and purpose, the general question of the overall 
effect on agricultural commodity markets was kept at the forefront of all analysis.      
 While the analyzed literature originates from both US and international sources, due to 
the world-wide effects of the food price crisis, the conclusions and recommendations will focus 
on the United States, as the US regulatory practices are the most influential through both setting 
regulatory precedence, and affecting the largest conglomerate of commodity markets. This will 
allow for more specific, and hopefully more productive conclusions and recommendations. 
 To produce these recommendations, I first looked at what differentiated these sources, 
especially focusing on the differences between each category of sources. Upon recognizing these 
differences, I then determined the effects on these distinctions on agricultural commodity 
markets, and from this, produced both policy recommendations as well as direction for further 
research.        
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Chapter 4: Literature Analysis 
Examining the role of the financialization of food on food prices became both a popular a 
topic, and an area in urgent need of greater research following the food price crisis of 2008. Over 
the past decade the literature surrounding this topic has changed directions as more information 
has become available and researchers have taken different approaches to studying commodity 
market activities. While there are conflicting viewpoints on the role that financialization has 
played in agricultural commodity markets, it is easiest to understand the development of these 
opposing views by looking at the literature chronologically. A chronological approach allows for 
the most effective way to explore the existing scholarship and illustrate how we arrived at the 
current landscape surrounding agricultural commodity trading. The following is broken down 
first by time periods, then thematically within each period. These thematic distinctions include 
types of source, i.e. policy influencers, popular journalism, and academic research, as well as 
distinctions among the research approaches, such as theoretical versus empirical approaches. The 
entirety of the section includes not only a description of the literature in this area, but also my 
analysis.     
Pre-2008 Food Price Crisis 
 Prior to the food price crisis of 2008, there was some literature on the financialization of 
agricultural commodity markets, but not nearly as heavy as the amount that followed soon after. 
Since such financialization did not begin until the early 2000’s, following the Commodity 
Futures Modernization Act of 2000, literature on the subject did not begin until about the mid-
2000’s. Following the passage of the CFMA there was a primarily positive reaction from 
investors and regulators as the purpose of the bill was to “promote legal certainty, enhance 
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competition, and reduce systemic risk in markets for futures and over-the- counter derivatives.”52 
In the years following the passage things seemed to be working smoothly, investment into 
agricultural derivatives continued to grow, and new derivatives were introduced into the market.  
 It was not until about 2007 that people began to have concerns about the increasing 
investment in commodities derivatives. In a 2007 concerns over whether commodity and equity 
markets were becoming a “market of one,” began to arise in popular financial literature.53 At this 
time, there seemed to be a correlation on returns of different classes, and typical diversification 
did not seem to bring its typical benefits for investors. Agricultural commodities were usually 
seen as a hedge, but on the eve of the financial, as well as food price, crisis, people began to 
wonder whether such commodities were an effective tool anymore. Other than this concern of 
the growing relationship between commodity and equity markets that began to be expressed 
around 2007, not much other discussion was given to the financialization of food, other than in 
reference to the increasing wealth it was providing to both investors and producers.  
Immediate Aftermath of the 2008 Food Price Crisis 
Governing Bodies and Organizations That Influenced Their Policy 
 After the dramatic increase of food prices in 2008 that pushed millions of people in 
developing nations into poverty, people began to heavily scrutinize the financialization of food, 
as many jumped to the conclusion that excess speculation of agricultural commodities was the 
root issue of this crisis. Investors, regulators, and some academics believed this was the catalyst 
of the food price increase and were quick to go into further research and put regulatory measures 
in place. The first to act were both the United States and international governing and research 
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groups, as they wanted to prevent the situation from getting worse or reoccurring in the near 
future. The research done by these organizations are important for discussion because they are 
the groups that have worked closest with regulators on this topic, making their research the most 
influential on policy to combat food price volatility. The close relationship between the 
following research and the policy created following the food price crisis is important for 
interpreting the regulations that resulted from the crisis, as there was a clear lack of influence 
from academic research in the resulting policy.             
The United Nations 
 The United Nations had their rapporteur on the right to food, Oliver De Schutter, release 
a briefing note on what they believed to cause the increased volatility in food prices and what 
their regulatory and investing recommendations would be, primarily focusing on the US and EU, 
and launched multiple studies on the issues to be presented at the annual UN trade and 
development conferences.54  
The briefing note revealed that they alleged that the increase in prices and volatility could 
“only be explained by the emergence of a speculative bubble.”55 The focus was on powerful 
institutional investors that were generally unconcerned with agricultural market fundamentals 
and the inability to describe the crisis by the fundamentals of supply and demand. Because 
institutional investors did not have a great concern for agricultural markets, speculation was not 
serving its purpose of price discovery, but rather was throwing commodity prices into contango, 
where prices in succeeding delivery progressively higher than the nearest delivery month, 
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continuing to make speculation seem more appealing.56 The burst of bubble was seen to burst 
when the large non-traditional speculators could no longer fund their permanent long positions 
because their investments in other markets were crashing due to the financial crisis. Much of 
what was used to describe this reasoning for the food crisis was based on theoretical approach, 
rather than through building economic models and empirically testing their logic. Their 
approach, while reasonable, makes one wonder if it is a bit oversimplified for such a complex 
market, with this being an argument that becomes popular in much of the later academic research 
surrounding the topic. 
The UN studies echoes much of the same logic from the De Schutter’s briefing note, 
while going into greater detail on how they arrived at such conclusion. Unlike the briefing note, 
the study also discusses at length, the effects herding could have had on such price volatility. 
Herding, which is the tendency of individual investors to imitate the actions of a larger group, 
rather than acting on their own and on the basis of their own information, can distort price 
discovery mechanisms, causing a large price deviation that is not justified by economic 
fundamentals, leading to an increased risk for price bubbles.57 These distortions can result in 
commodity prices that do not reflect the relative scarcity of such products, which “impairs the 
allocation of resources, has negative effects on the real economy and lead to food crisis, thereby 
threating the lives of the poorest.”58 For the UN, it appears that information flows, which seems 
to be disrupted and distorted by the financialization of food, are the core of the food price 
volatility issue. 
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Other studies were initiated that used Granger causality tests that relate returns on futures 
contracts to changes in the positions of index investors to test the effects of increase index 
investments, as well as using economic models to test for herd behavior, discussed above, that 
results in bubble behavior is agricultural commodity markets.59 It should be noted that in the case 
of the UN’s studies, and studies discussed later that utilize Granger causality tests, that there are 
a multitude of issues surrounding Granger causality interpretation that lead to erroneous tests due 
to the common occurrence of either inappropriate sampling frequency, the existence of rational 
expectations, nonlinear casual relationships, or time series cointergration.60 The conclusion from 
such tests was that “index-based investment generated a bubble in commodity futures prices,” 
and that “index investors do appear to have amplified fundamentally-driven price movements.”61                             
 The recommendations from the UN’s studies and briefing note, are both similar and 
logically follow from their believed reasoning for such issue. Their five major ways to improve 
included: comprehensive derivatives trading reform through tighter regulation, increased 
expertise in regulatory bodies, restricted access to commodities markets, increased transparency 
in both physical and OTC markets, and the establishment of both physical virtual reserves.62 As a 
note, virtual reserves are an intervention mechanism that could be used during food crises’ where 
countries back a reserve with promissory funds and if certain alarms are triggered, there is a 
group in place that takes action, using such funds, to intervene in the market to lower the sharp 
spike in food prices.63         
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Other International Organizations 
 The International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) also believed that increased 
speculation was a major source of food price increases that resulted in the food price crisis. The 
IFPRI, like many others at the time, used Granger causality tests to look for a causal link 
between speculation and increasing prices.64 By doing causality tests for wheat, rice, maize, and 
soybeans they found that the ratio of monthly volume to open interest in futures contracts had an 
influence in forecasting price movements, so that past changes in the ratio helped to predict 
future changes in the price, indicating that speculation could affect food prices. Having 
conclusions like those the UN, the IFPRI gave a similar set of recommendations, including the 
distinctive virtual reserves recommendation.  
 Oxfam, an international confederation of charitable organizations that focuses on 
alleviating global poverty, also released a popular report that resonated with the theories of both 
the UN and IFPRI, which, as a note, are the same theories that appear in the US government’s 
research discussed in the following section.65 Unlike the other groups, Oxfam did not conduct 
their own study, but rather by referencing other studies that had been done at the time, came to a 
set of recommendations suggesting their belief that increased speculation and distorted access to  
information among investors were key reasons for the food price crisis.66 They came to such 
conclusion despite their unique admission, when compared other similar organization, that the 
“impact of speculation on food prices today remains disputed and cannot be currently proven.”67 
Oxfam’s report also puts greater focus on the ABCD companies role in the food price crisis, 
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specifically their ability to use their information on physical markets when acting as commercial 
investors engaging in speculative activity for third parties through their subsidiaries that only 
focus on providing investment services, adding another layer to the distortions in information 
available to different investors.68  
 Papers released by the UN, IFPRI, and Oxfam are often referred to when describing the 
popular view in the years following the food price crisis and shaped much of the general 
population’s thoughts on reasoning behind the crisis.69 This lead to their heavy influence on the 
subsequent policy. Aside from these groups, other international organizations also considered the 
different sources of the increase in food price volatility.                 
The Bank for International Settlements discussed the financialization of food in light of 
the food price crisis in its 2010/2011 annual report stating that evidence is showing that 
commodity markets were acting in ways that are familiar to traditional financial asset markets, 
explaining this through swings in investor risk aversion and herding behavior.70 While 
mentioning this was the general belief at the time, they were also one of the first, outside of strict 
academia, to note that too much emphasis might be placed on speculating as the cause for the 
heavy price increases, and that research should also start to focus in other areas for further 
explanation.  
The World Bank also considered the issue, but focused their research on ways to help 
developing companies combat sudden price increases, rather than looking at the root cause for 
such price increases, and just echoing the seemingly theoretical approach similar to Oxfam.71 It 
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should be noted, the World Bank looked back into the issue from a more empirical standpoint in 
2016, which will be discussed later.  
The United States 
 Soon after agricultural prices began to surge, the US government was quick to realize 
they needed to look into the issue to assess current policy and see what they could do to prevent 
the issue from getting worse. Prior to the Senate issuing a full investigation on excess 
speculation, specifically focusing on the wheat market, they began by taking testimony from 
those in the industry. Most prominent, and quoted in numerous academic sources, was the 
testimony from Michael Masters, a hedge fund manager whose testimony played a major role in 
Congress’s decision to pass legislation to curb the role of excess speculation.72  
Masters’ primary point in his testimony is to show why he believes “institutional 
investors are one of, if not the primary, factors affecting commodity prices.”73 Masters’ claims 
that these institutional investors are acting differently from the traditional commodity speculators 
due to their demand only arising from portfolio allocation decisions and their insensitivity to 
price per unit as they will buy as many contracts as they need to put all their money to work. He 
also argues that because commodity markets are much smaller than capital markets, their 
multibillion dollar allocations in commodity markets have a greater direct impact on food 
prices.74 He blames most of this on the CTFC’s regulation which he claims gives speculators 
unlimited access commodity futures markets through the exemption of position limits that is 
allowed when hedging OTC swaps transactions. Along with his explanation for the surge in food 
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prices, he also outlined a three step process he believed would immediately reduce index 
speculation. Masters’ recommends prohibiting commodity index replication strategies as 
unsuitable pension investments, place position limits on all speculators, and have the CTFC 
reclassify all the positions in the commercial category of traders to distinguish between physical 
traders and bank controlled traders, as well as classifying bank traders further by their swap 
types.75 It is important to note that Masters’ focused on both agricultural and crude commodities 
in his testimony, and upon further inspection of his investment portfolio one might think that he 
had ulterior motives in his testimony.76 Much of his portfolio includes holdings that are affected 
by the price of oil, so pushing for regulation that would keep oil prices low could help his 
investments, making one question the complete accuracy of his testimony. While it is important 
to keep this in mind when looking at his testimony, the influence it had on the Senates 
investigation and subsequent regulation, especially in the Dodd-Frank act is apparent.  
In 2008 an investigation into excess speculation in wheat markets was launched, with the 
report being released in 2009. The committee found “that there is significant and persuasive 
evidence to conclude that these commodity index traders, in the aggregate, were one of the major 
causes of “unwarranted changes”—here, increases—in the price of wheat futures contracts 
relative to the price of wheat in the cash market. The resulting unusual, persistent, and large 
disparities between wheat futures and cash prices impaired the ability of participants in the grain 
market to use the futures market to price their crops and hedge their price risks over time, and 
therefore constituted an undue burden on interstate commerce.” Consequently, the Report finds 
that the aggregate activities of commodity index traders, constituted “excessive speculation” in 
the wheat market under the Commodity Exchange Act.” They then go on to recommend that the 
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CFTC phase out waivers and exemptions from position limits that were granted to commodity 
index traders purchasing wheat contracts to help offset their sales of speculative financial 
instruments tied to commodity indexes.77  
To conduct their investigation, the committee looked at daily and monthly wheat futures 
and cash prices from the all the major trading exchanges, historical data form operations and 
performance of grains futures markets, and talked with many people in the industry, agricultural 
economists, academics, and financial institutions. In examining the market analysis, they looked 
at from “market analysts, investment advisors, and academic scholars,” most of these studies 
complied and sifted through extensive amounts of data, but it should be noted that, as was the 
norm at the time, none were building economic models to try and explain the price increase, and 
demonstrate their theories. After the government expressed interest in this issue, economists then 
began to study this area and build models, leading to new theories which will be discussed in a 
later section.           
Academic Research  
 Soon after the food price crisis, there were a group of academics that quickly went to 
work on trying to figure out what caused such spikes. It should be noted that NGO’s and 
regulatory bodies were the first to really consider this issue, and that greater academic interest 
began to develop following the publishing of reports like those from the UN and the US Senate 
subcommittee on investigations. The academic literature of the immediate aftermath was 
seemingly inconclusive, as some echoed, in both methods and findings, that of the previous 
section, Governing Bodies and Organizations That Influenced Their Policy, while others 
initiated the conversation that challenged the more popular theories at the time. This mismatch in 
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conclusions is generally a result of the approach taken. Theoretical approaches generally agreed 
with the governing bodies and their influencers, while academics that took an empirical approach 
more often challenged the conclusion from the theoretical and policy influencing researchers.  
Theoretical Approach 
 Rather than building economic models and preforming statistical analysis, many 
academics found a logical way to explain the food price crisis given the drastic changes and 
increased interest in agricultural commodity trading that occurred in the decade prior to the 
crisis. Similar to the some of the work done by different international and well regarded NGOs, 
these researchers argue that basic market fundamentals alone cannot explain the food price crisis 
and instead use speculation and increased index investment to explain these events.78 In order to 
initially justify their theories, they argue that because there were sharp spikes in 2008, with 
prices tumbling midyear, that neither short-term supply and demand factors, nor other real 
economic tendencies could explain this, and given that such severe price spikes were historically 
unprecedented a recent development in the market must have been the reason for this activity.79 
Because of the large inflow of investments into index funds with the intention to speculate, 
prices were distorted, reinforcing instability, thus increasing market inefficiency and leading to 
periodic bubbles.80 These prices came tumbling down when institutional investors could no 
longer fund their positons because of the failing financial and housing markets at the time.81  
 Additionally, they justify the idea of increased speculation being the driver of such price 
spikes because futures markets were acting opposite of how traditional hedging and speculation 
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should encourage them to act. The purpose of futures markets is to hedge against price 
fluctuations, implying that futures prices would be lower than spot prices because the selling of 
futures contracts would exceed the demand for them. However, during the period of extreme 
food price volatility, futures prices were higher than spot prices, and therefore, there was not 
enough hedging, and too many investors were speculating as they anticipated profit from the 
rising prices.82 While a handful of general academics and many well-known international 
organizations utilized a theoretical framework to justify their views that increased index 
investment resulted in increased food price volatility, Michael Masters also took this approach. 
Michael Masters. While it is hard to classify Michael Masters work as “academic” given that his 
work was never included in peer-reviewed journals or published in a source that he did not have 
control over, his heavy citation in the US Senate reports and numerous testimonies before the US 
Congress and CTFC makes his work important for discussion. While the general idea behind his 
theory is discussed in section about the US government’s immediate reaction to the food price 
crisis, a bit more should be said about his theory due to his deep influence.  
Master’s theory became so popular among those interested in this area, that once Irwin 
and Sanders referred to his general idea that unprecedented activity from index investors created 
a large bubble in commodity futures prices that was transferred to spot prices through arbitrage 
links as the “Masters Hypothesis,” researchers began to generally refer to the overall idea of 
increased index investment and speculation causing the food price crisis as the “Masters 
Hypothesis.”83 This heavy influence also potentially impacted the quality of early studies done, 
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as because most studies were done in response to the government reaction to the food price 
crisis, and because the government reaction focused a lot on Masters’ theory, researchers focused 
primarily on commodity index traders positons, a single variable. Focusing on price movements 
through a single variable runs into a common issue in statistical analysis, failing to include or 
control for all relevant variables, resulting in a greater possibility for invalid results.84 While 
Masters work influenced much of the technical empirical research done, especially in the 
immediate aftermath of the crisis, his research is free from almost any technical analysis and is 
based primarily on market observations. While Masers’ argument seems logical given the 
information he provides, the inability of empirical tests to confirm the different facets of this 
theory, makes one question both the accuracy of his logic and whether his work should have had 
such a substantial influence on policy.85 Another important individual to the theoretical research 
in this area, who, unlike Masters, can definitely be classified as an academic, is Jennifer Clapp.  
 Jennifer Clapp. Because of the heavy impact and influence Clapp has had on this area of 
research, it is worth discussing all her work in a one section, as well as exposing the gaps in her 
research that might have contributed to the recent movement of questioning her theories. Clapp’s 
references in both popular journalism and academic sources makes her an interesting and 
important researcher to analyze. Unlike other researchers, she looks much further than just the 
economics of the food price crisis, and focuses on a wire variety of aspects that could have 
contributed to the food price crisis, making her helpful in trying to create effective policy. 
Additionally, Clapp is unique in her heavy focus on examining the role of major agri-food 
companies in the food price crisis. Clapp, who also collaborated with other researchers in her 
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work, echoes much of the general theory that the United Nations developed in looking at the 
food price crisis. She attributes much of the increase in prices to the increased role of non-
traditional investors in agricultural markets, as well as the general increase in derivative trading. 
Prior to sticking to this idea, Clapp simply pushed for tighter regulation due to how politicized 
the financialization of food became after 2007, rather than providing reasons for the increase in 
price volatility.86  
 After pushing for an increase in regulation, Clapp began to explore the direct 
consequences and the intricacies of the financialization of food, leading to consistent citation in 
literature surround this topic, both by those that both agree and disagree with her position. Clapp 
puts a heavy focus on this idea of ‘distancing’ in the food system, which she describes as 
distancing in terms of knowledge about the food’s production and impact, abstracting foods from 
their physical form into commodity derivatives, and the addition of more decision points from 
production to consumption.87 Clapp looks at how banks, like Goldman Sachs and BlackRock, 
agricultural commodity trading firms, like the ABCD firms, and large-scale third party investors, 
such as hedge funds and pension funds, all might have played a role in the food price volatility.88  
 Her view influence of banks and large-scale third party investors are somewhat similar, 
essentially scrutinizing deregulation and investors seeking profits in and around the community 
chain through derivatives that are abstractions from the physical commodity. Because these 
derivatives are primality sold OTC, their ability to hold them for longer period allows them to 
reap greater profits as the commodity prices climb, a consequence of speculation.89 The banks 
took on risk because if the commodity index prices rose they would have to make payments to 
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the investors, causing them to hedge these risks by purchasing physical commodity futures 
contracts so they would gain if prices roses and be able to make payments. This caused banks to 
push for the relaxation of position limits due to their desire to sell OTC products, while hedging 
in the commodity exchange market, thus introducing the issue of the blurring distinction between 
banks and commodity trading firms.90  
 Clapp, like most researchers in this area, focus on the ABCD firms, as they are the largest 
traders of physical agricultural commodities, and have played a key role in the financialization of 
food through their establishment of financial service divisions.91 While, like banks, the ABCD 
firms are providing agricultural derivative products to third-party investors, they are also giving 
advice to major farmers and foods on how to hedge their risk in agricultural markets, and thus 
the opportunity for exploitation emerges. Clapp argues for concern that these firms are engaging 
in both hedging and speculation, but can hide their speculative activities behind their legitimate 
hedging. She contends that they are capitalizing on their insider knowledge and wide-spread 
experience in the industry to exploit futures markets to generate profits beyond legitimate 
hedging, a theory she further legitimizes through existence of investment funds these firms have 
created for both internal purposes and external clients.92  
 While the firms deny any speculative activities on their internal investments, they cannot 
deny the financial services for speculative purposes they provide for external clients, a part of 
their business that Clapp argues could also have resulted in increased food price volatility. 
Because traders have a commercial link to physical commodities, they have exemptions from 
regulation that attempts to prevent market manipulation from speculative activities, due to their 
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need to hedge their risks that result from buying, selling, and storing commodities. These same 
exemptions apply to their operations on commodities futures markets since they are end-users of 
the commodity, yet since their funds are open to other investors she believes they using such 
investors to play the game of other speculators, while still enjoying exemptions on things like 
position limits.93 
 The idea of investors manipulating markets for their own gain has been an issue the 
ABCD firms have run into, especially when their attempts to do so occur through trading on an 
electronic platform. In 2009, Bunge fined for violating the Commodities and Exchange Act for 
placing buy and sell orders for soybeans that they had no intentions to execute in the pre-opening 
trading session. They were simply trying to get information about price levels by doing this, and 
thus cancelled their order prior to the opening price broadcast to the CME. Their activity 
influenced the opening price and thus were violation by manipulating prices to be reported that 
were not true.94 While this is an example that could be traced due to the electronic trading 
platform being used, Clapp argues there are other ways to achieve more discreet market 
manipulation through using physical commodities.95  
   It should also be noted that an evolution in Clapp’s work can be seen that echoes the 
changing trends in the literature surrounding this subject, by shying away from the thought that 
increased speculation was the primary culprit for the food price crisis.96 While she does not use 
the primarily economics focused approach that will be discussed in the section on current 
literature, she instead turns to looking at how to ensure that new policy will not work against the 
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goal of food security.97 This more recent work is further than the scope of this paper, but 
nonetheless her taking a step back from an area she wrote heavily about in the years following 
the food price crisis is telling of the change in direction around this subject, yet her focus on the 
idea of distancing is one that continues to be an important topic in this area. While the theoretical 
explanations of the food price crisis presented by different academics, like Clapp, and well-
known international organizations are attractive due to the greater simplicity of the rationale 
behind the price spike, this simplicity is also alarming due to the complex nature of this issue. 
Having these theories as a launch point allowed others to take an empirical approach to both try 
and explain the food price volatility and delve into the complexities of this issue.  
Empirical Approach  
 In the aftermath of the food price crisis, especially after governing bodies and major 
NGOs began to blame financial speculation and increased index investing for the food price 
crisis, researchers began to test to see if these theories held. The most popular approach for 
testing to see investor’s activity caused the price spikes was through using Granger-causality 
tests. Granger-causality is when “a time series variable, A, causes B if the probability of B 
conditional on its own past history and the history of A does not equal the probability of B 
conditional on its own past history alone.”98 The vast majority of empirical research in the five or 
so years that followed the crisis included Granger tests. Like before, the overall results from 
these tests were inconclusive, as tests not only from different researchers but also from different 
tests performed by the same people would lead to opposing views on whether or not this 
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increased investment in agricultural commodities, allowed by the decrease in regulation, caused 
the increase in volatility. Additionally, there is a possibility for these opposing results due to 
each test using different inputs to test for causality.  
 Two commonly cited studies that found a positive Granger-causality when looking at 
whether or not flows from investors impacted the prices and return dynamics of commodities 
futures returns, used the same inputs to test different output variables.99 Both used CTFC data on 
commodity index traders as their time series variable, where Brunetti and Reiffen looked the 
traders effect on price risk insurance and Singleton looked at their affect crude oil futures prices, 
which are worth looking at due to both their similar behavior to agricultural commodities during 
this time, as well as their influence on agricultural commodity production. Brunetti and Reiffen 
looked at the three largest agricultural futures markets – corn, soy, and wheat – and found that 
commodity index traders affected the risk premium of these commodities by reducing hedging 
costs leading to temporary increases in futures returns.100 Their findings are also consistent with 
other studies that look at how increased hedging demand leads to greater returns on long futures 
positions when speculators are capital constrained, due to the speculators constraint resulting in 
limits to hedging, which limits the risk taking capabilities of speculators and adversely affects 
the hedging producer, resulting in an increase in spot price.101 Furthermore, studies looking how 
increased hedging demand can increase spot prices, have admitted that these “channels are based 
on limited risk-sharing…and risk-sharing arguments are unlikely to explain the full magnitude of 
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the rise and fall in prices.”102  Singleton, using the same inputs as Brunetti and Reiffen, looked at 
crude oil and found that the increase of index investors and managed-money accounts had 
significant positive effects on 2008 oil price spikes. In coming to this conclusion, Singleton 
accounted for the effects of stock returns, emerging economies, open interest, and lagged futures 
returns.103 Further than just looking at oil commodities, Singleton notes that “in any market 
setting where there are limits to the amount of capital investors are willing to commit to an asset 
class…large increases in desired long or short positrons by any class of investors can potentially 
impact prices.”104 While these studies, and some others found positive Granger-causality, there 
seems to be a greater number of studies that were not successful in finding such causality.  
 Sanders and Irwin preformed numerous tests in this area, all of which included some 
component of Granger-causality testing. One study specifically tested the “Masters Hypothesis,” 
by using Granger-causality, long-horizon regression, and Fama-MacBeth tests.105 In testing 19 
commodity futures commodity markets, their overall evidence could not support the “Masters 
Hypothesis.” The primary focus of this study was the Fama-MacBeth test, which is a type of 
cross-sectional regression test whose model is based off the Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(CAPM), which describes relationship between market risk and expected returns for assets. They 
then used both Granger-causality and long-horizon regression tests to support their Fama-
MacBeth findings. Using both forms of support allowed for greater confirmation of their findings 
because Granger tests are not as accurate in detecting relationships over long horizons, so using 
long-horizon regression allowed the possibility of bubble behavior to be exposed.106 This also 
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explains why Granger tests often use daily positons and returns as an input. Overall, their “cross-
sectional regression tests provide very little evidence that increases in commodity index 
investment are associated with contemporaneous or subsequent commodity futures returns on 
volatility,” supported by Granger tests finding “no causal linkages between fund positions and 
subsequent market returns,” and having the long-horizon regression “null-hypothesis of no 
impact [of index investments] not rejected in a single case.”107     
Sanders and Irwin designed two other studies that focused more heavily on causality 
tests. One test used CTFC data that is not publically available to test if index funds affected 
grains futures prices, and the other looked at the affect swap dealers’ positions had on 12 
different agricultural commodity markets.108 Looking at grains futures prices, they failed to find 
any causal link between commodity index activity and grains futures prices, further noting that 
they found little evidence of an index caused price bubble by using long-horizon regression. In 
their second study, their decision to use sway dealers’ positions assumes that “they reflect index-
type investment since much of the commodity index-based investment is delivered through 
swaps.”109 They used both Granger-causality and a ‘Seemingly Unrelated Regression’ to test this 
relationship, and found no evidence of causality.  
 Also, using Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) and Granger-causality, Aulerrich, 
Irwin, and Garcia, used a different set of inputs from The Large Traders Reporting System 
database to study twelve different agricultural commodity markets for the impact of index-
investors on commodity prices. The advantage of using SUR is its ability to improve the results 
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of the causality tests by considering “the contemporaneous correlation of model residuals across 
markets and allows rest of the overall impact of index investment across markets.”110 Overall, the 
results of their study indicate that “buying pressure from financial index investment did not cause 
massive bubbles in agricultural futures prices.”111  
 Stoll and Whaley also looked at all twelve different agricultural commodity markets that 
the CTFC posted weekly index position data for to preform six different analyses, which utilized 
Granger-causality.112 They came to three primary conclusions: commodity index investment is 
not speculation, commodity index roles have little futures price impact, and the failure of the 
wheat futures price to converge to the cash price at the contract’s expiration had not undermined 
the futures contract’s effectiveness as a risk management tool. These conclusions are almost in 
direct contrast to the report released by the Senate subcommittee, as this study was done as a 
reaction to the findings of the Senate report.  
 Brunetti and Buyuksahin, note that Brunetti had previous found evidence in favor of 
index investing affecting futures prices, looked at non-public daily position data of commodity 
index traders in the corn market to look for Granger-causality in corn futures prices.113 Not only 
did they find that speculative trading does not destabilize markets, but also that speculative 
trading activity actually reduces volatility levels. The reduction in risk is interesting, as Brunetti 
in his study discussed previously, found index traders to increase risk. This is further evidence 
that using different inputs to test the same question can lead to somewhat contradictory 
outcomes. While much of the empirical research at this time seemed to think that institutional 
investors did not have as great of an impact on futures prices resulting in bubbles and spot price 
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increases, popular literature at the time did not seem to agree, and instead published information 
more in line with the international organizations and the findings of the US government. 
Popular Literature  
 Popular literature following the food price crisis had a fairly uniformed voice that echoed 
much of the work done by the large international organizations and theoretical researchers, 
making it also fall in line with the policy reactions of the US government. Because a consistent 
view was communicated through the channels most accessible to the general public, the 
academics thoughts on this area when heavily unheard. 
 As the food price crisis played out during 2008, initial reactions in popular journalism 
were focused on the social implications in developing nations.114 Riots broke out in such nations 
as the starving populations in these countries were growing at unprecedented rates, and people 
were initially focused on quick ways to assist these populations with a “damage-control” 
mindset, rather than focusing on the causes of the crisis. In such situation, this reaction seems 
logical, yet surprisingly, in early 2008 there was early speculation of the role of institutional 
investors in the crisis expressed in popular literature. In February of 2008, Time’s article that 
discussed the multitude of global issues resulting from the rapid growth in food prices discussed 
investors as the “winners” of the crisis where the speculators that have poured billions into 
commodities are “further accelerating price rises.”115 While not a direct accusation, the early 
blaming of speculative investors prior to the crisis fully panning out and without evidence 
backing such assertions is not surprising given the journalism that follows.  
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 As the food price continued and came towards an end around mid-2008, the journalists 
moved forward with the idea of increased investment triggering the food price increases. At this 
point, many journalists focused on how the unprecedented amount of investment in commodity 
markets, especially by investors not traditionally involved in this market, was causing the 
commodity market system to completely breakdown and not function as intended due to this 
investment increasing volatility.116 Speculator’s reputation began to tarnish as the blame 
continued to shift towards them. Even in pieces that extensively acknowledged the importance of 
speculators in ensuring that commodity markets function properly, excess speculation became 
the focus of increasing food price volatility. The outsized inflow of investment into a market not 
designed to handle such level of speculative investment developed into an attractive cause for the 
increase in food prices, also resulting in early calls to action for policy reform by the US 
government.117 Even the Financial Times, which will be discussed later as having a neutral 
opinion on the subject, criticized speculators in mid-2008. Opening the article with the line, 
“spectators are clearly responsible for high commodity prices,” they too entertain the idea of 
speculators driving up commodity prices.118 But in staying true their impartial opinion, the need 
for more research is heavily emphasized throughout the article.          
 As the idea of investors playing a major role in the food price crisis became a more 
popular area of research, journalist increasingly pointed the finger at investors for driving up 
food prices. Harper’s Magazine had cover story where the byline read, “How Wall Street starved 
millions and got away with it,” which heavily criticized both the financial divisions of the major 
agri-food companies and large banks like Goldman Sachs and J.P. Morgan for their role in the 
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food price crisis through their substantial use of commodity index funds.119 The author, 
Frederick Kaufman, has no reservations in attributing the food price crisis to the emergence of a 
speculative food bubble. The beautifully written, about 6,500 word piece, did a wonderful job 
explaining the history behind commodity markets and describing the current landscape of 
agriculture market trading, but did very little in describing how such a speculative bubble could 
have emerged. The allusions to negative outcomes of the increased investment in agricultural 
commodity index funds seemed to suggest the possibility of a speculative bubble, but such 
support did not seem adequate in justifying his firm conviction that a speculative bubble caused 
the food price crisis. This lack of support for bold statements is a reoccurring issue in the popular 
journalism following the crisis. It should be noted that Kaufman is a prominent food journalist, 
whose educational background is exclusively in English and journalism, writes for publications 
like Harper’s Magazine and The New Yorker, and has also written a handful of books on global 
food system. In his articles and books that explore aspects of the food price crisis, the lack of 
reference or mention of research in more technical financial and economic areas can call into 
question the validity of some of his statements on financial markets.120 Kaufman’s Harper’s 
Magazine article provoked much controversy in the food world due to its heavy readership, 
resulting in Kaufman making appearances on NBC Nightly News, MSNBC, Fox Business News, 
Democracy Now, and Bloomberg TV, as well as being featured on NPR and BBC World 
Service. In these appearances and features he communicated the same basic message behind his 
article, again restricting the general public to not only one view of the causes of the food price 
crisis, but also continuing to grow the awareness of this issue to an audience that otherwise 
would likely have had little knowledge on the issue.  
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 Michael Masters’ theory that he testified before Congress with not only influenced policy 
and initiated a heavy flow of academic research, but also made its way into popular journalism. 
In mid-2010 The Economist published an article, rare in subject matter for the time, exploring 
the idea that it seems likely that speculative investors did not cause the food price crisis.121 
Within five days of the articles publication, Michael Masters, along with two other business men, 
wrote a response letter to the this article, criticizing the author’s analysis of speculators role in 
agricultural commodity markets leading up to the food price crisis.122 Their critique which 
utilizes logic like that in Masters’ testimony and publications, does make the important point that 
research is subject to important data limitations. While an important point, this focus on data 
limitations seems to be too often of a crutch for those whose theories are in contrast with much 
of the empirical research.  
 Also drawing on Masters’ Congressional testimony, former congressman, Joseph P. 
Kennedy II wrote a popular op-ed piece in The New York Times calling for greater regulation of 
speculative commodity trading beyond what the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act put in 
place.123 Both quoting and using similar logic to Masters, Kennedy calls out speculators for 
driving up prices, focusing specifically on oil commodities. While Kennedy does not focus on 
agricultural commodities, the intertwinement of oil and agricultural commodity markets, 
agricultural commodities’ reliance on oil, and his use of reasoning that mimics that behind 
speculative food price increases makes his article relevant in the discussion of the food price 
crisis. Additionally, because the piece came from a former congressman one might imagine that 
readers could have given greater merit to his continuation of the dialogue that faults speculators 
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for driving up commodity prices. Like Masters, Kennedy has ties to the oil market that benefit 
from regulation that would promote lower oil prices. While Kennedy’s ties are not through 
portfolio investment, he is the founder, president, and chairman of Citizens Energy Corporation, 
a non-profit that focuses on providing the poor with home heating oil. While this is not to 
discount the validity of his statements, the possibility of such ulterior motives is worth noting, 
along with explaining his interest in the subject, especially since the major focus of financial 
writing in popular journalism was the 2008 financial crisis.    
 The popular journalism on the food price crisis discussed in this section came out in the 
aftermath of the financial crisis, whose consequences were felt more heavily in the US than the 
consequences of the food crisis. Thus, most finance focused popular journalism was dedicated to 
discussing the financial crisis. Amidst this, there was some discussion of how well major agri-
food companies preformed despite the economic downturn. While there is less discussion of the 
major agri-food companies’ role in the food price crisis compared to discussed responsibility of 
institutional investors, the mentions of their ability to fight the downturn focuses on their 
growing commodity trading divisions.124 These companies are commended for having record 
earnings despite their connection to the unstable markets, even though this ability to resist the 
downturn is traced to the activities that most popular journalist blamed the food price crisis for, 
increased speculation and index investment. As NGOs and major international organizations, 
like those previously discussed, continued to publish findings supporting the idea that 
speculation and index investing drove the food price crisis, popular journalism followed by 
publishing pieces that primarily drew their information from these sources.  
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 The articles that heavily cite these sources are effectively slightly more sensationalized, 
easier to read, collections of these studies.125 Using lines like, “since high-finance got in a frenzy 
about food, one billion – a seventh of the world’s population – cannot afford to eat,” these pieces 
made reading about a more technical economic subject much more interesting.126 While some of 
these articles make sure to mention either the research showing that these theories might not be 
true, or the opinions of those in the industry who have issue with trying to prove such causality, 
the striking comments that blame the rich for starving the poor seem to standout, especially for 
the general reader. Unlike many of the popular journalism sources discussed so far, The 
Financial Times seemed to have a generally different approach when discussing the food price 
crisis.  
 The articles discussed thus far all generally took a side, usually placing financial 
speculators in the line of fire for driving up the prices of agricultural commodities. Financial 
Times, on the other hand, took a seemingly neutral standpoint in almost all its articles that look 
at institutional investors role in the food price crisis.127 Apart from the Financial Times article 
discussed previously, which is the earliest of all articles found in FT that looked at the subject, 
the authors seemed more careful about making accusatory statements and continually expressed 
the opposing arguments about whatever particular facet of the food price crisis they were 
discussing. Also, unlike many of the other popular journalism sources, Financial Times is UK 
based publication, rather than US based like most of the others. While all the publications have 
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writers in both the US and UK, the culture dominating the style of these publications is different, 
possibly attributing to their different approach in discussing issues.  
 As the markets recovered from the food price crisis and other economic issues surfaced, 
discussion of the food price crisis and the financial world’s role in it was no longer a hot topic 
for popular journalism. Similarly, the large NGOs and other well-known international 
organizations that initially influenced policy pulled back from looking at the role of investors in 
the food price crisis and began to focus on the newer controversial food sovereignty issues.    
Contrastingly, academic research continued to explore the food price crisis and look for new 
ways to analyze it.  
Current Discussion 
	 More recently, both academic research and popular journalism has continued to explore 
the effects of increased investment in agricultural commodities, typically still looking at the food 
price crisis, as well as looking at the food price increases that continued following the crisis. 
Additionally, there is not a section that primarily focuses on governing bodies and the policy 
influencing international organizations, as their recent research has not focused on the effects of 
agricultural commodity deregulation on the market, rather they have turned their focus to new 
areas of popular research surrounding food prices that do not involve agricultural commodities, 
and thus are beyond the scope of this paper.           
Academic Research   
 Recent academic research surrounding investor’s role in the 2008 food crisis has taken 
the research from the immediate aftermath a step further in analysis and attempted to address 
some of the issues that came out of the previous research, while still echoing the same ideas and 
coming to similar conclusions. Recent research has also attempted to take a holistic view of the 
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possible issues arising from investors increased involvement in commodity markets, with hopes 
that this information could lead to efforts in more effective regulation of agricultural commodity 
markets. 
 Some of the current research is an extension of what was looked at in the immediate 
aftermath. With Masters’ heavy influence on the food crisis’s resulting policy, researchers 
continued to examine the “Masters Hypothesis.” Hamilton and Wu break down Masters’ theory 
that “buying pressure from index speculators overwhelmed selling pressure from producers and 
the result was skyrocketing commodity prices,” into its two different stages and build a model to 
specifically test the validity of the first stage, as the second stage of his theory cannot be fulfilled 
if the logic behind the first stage does not prove true.128 The first stage of his theory claims that 
increased volume on the buy side drives up the price of futures contract, and in the second stage 
higher futures prices would be sufficient on their own to produce an increase in spot prices. This 
first stage, which had not been previously researched in isolation, allowed them to look 
specifically at the mechanisms that would allowed index-fund buying to affect the price and what 
evidence would detail such effect. Through building a model in which increased volumes of buy 
orders would affect future prices by changing the equilibrium risk premium, and using inputs 
from twelve different commodities, they, like many before, found that index-investing had little 
impact on futures prices in commodity markets.  
 Continuing the idea of taking a different approach to previous empirical testing, while 
also utilizing the increased knowledge and data that has surfaced since the aftermath of the food 
price crisis, Etienne, Irwin, and Garcia looked at whether index traders drive bubbles in grain 
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futures markets.129 Unlike previous research, this study looks at data on corn, soybeans, and 
wheat traded between January 2004 and June 2015. This extended period of data is useful for a 
more accurate analysis of whether index investment caused bubbles because it takes into account 
not only the major price spikes that led to the food crisis, but also price spikes that have occurred 
in subsequent years. This data also allows for analysis of markets that were not concurrently 
being impacted by the effects of the 2008 financial crisis. This study also uses newly developed 
econometric tests that rigorously date-stamp bubbles and non-bubbles when analyzing the price 
impact of index investment. While new knowledge in econometric testing was applied, the 
previously cautioned Granger-causality tests were also relied on, but with the support of 
robustness checks. Overall, their findings “provide little support for the dual claims that grain 
futures prices recently experienced large and long-lasting bubbles and that index-investment was 
a primary driver of those bubbles.”130 Apart from using new techniques to explore similar 
variations of the research questions asked in the wake of the food crisis, researchers recently 
started looking at the role of informational frictions in the spikes of food prices. 
 Previously, research has been focused on commodity index traders, who invest in many 
different types of indices, derivatives and funds, forcing researchers to make assumptions about 
the information available to these traders when preforming their analyses. Henderson, Pearson, 
and Wang attempted to avoid this assumption by restricting their analysis to commodity-linked 
notes (CLNs), which allow a look into non-information based trades.131 These researchers claim 
that investment activities involving CLNs are not information based because these activities do 
not express information about market fundamentals, and the structure of CLNs make them poor 
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vehicles for speculating on commodity prices. They find that CLNs, while using them to 
generally refer to “investment flows that do not convey information about fundamentals,” do in 
fact impact commodity futures prices.132 These findings are consistent with are of research in the 
area, that focuses on the role of informational frictions in commodity markets, which again plays 
into the idea of taking a broader look at the role of agricultural commodity investment in the 
food price crisis. Specifically, this research on CLNs is consistent with models where 
“informational fictions prevent commodity market participants from observing fundamentals, 
causing them to misinterpret demand for commodity positons that is not based on information or 
related to macroeconomic fundamentals as conveying information about future macroeconomic 
growth, impacting market prices.”133  
 Sockin and Xiong are most often cited for exploring the role of informational fictions in 
commodity markets. Informational frictions can best be described by a market that is absent of 
them, a market where agents directly observe both supply and demand shocks. Sockin and Xiong 
look at the effects of informational frictions in commodity markets by aggregating information 
about the strength of the economy, important producers’ production decisions, commodity 
demand, and the feedback effects of informational noise.134 Their model showed that “noise in 
futures market trading can interfere with goods producers’ expectations and affect their 
commodity demand” and additionally that in the presence of severe informational frictions, a 
large inflow of investment capital could distort signals coming from commodity prices and lead 
to confusion that amplified the boom and bust of commodity prices.135 This idea of looking at 
how the information available to investors, which could be distorted due to increased investment, 
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could be driver of commodity price spikes has garnered some additional popularity because of 
possibility that these models can also explain oil price spikes.   
 Gilbert and Pfuderer look at the role of index traders in price formation for both grains 
and oilseeds markets by using both Granger-causality and instrumental variable methods.136 
Gilbert and Pfuderer criticize Granger-causality from the onset, explaining their decision to also 
use an instrumental variable method. Their Granger-causality analysis is consistent with the 
majority of other previous empirical research, where the Granger-causal impacts are not 
discernable, and thus causality cannot be shown. Their instrumental variable research on the 
other hand, provided strong evidence that changes in index positions can help predict future 
changes in aggregate commodity price indices, thus suggesting that “changes in index 
investment are in part driven by information which predicts commodity prices changes over the 
coming months.”137 This relationship is interesting because, it is consistent with the view that 
some index investors are investing in commodity futures through an active strategy based on 
assessments of likely futures returns, rather than through a passive diversification strategy based 
on past risk and returns, the traditional commodity futures investment strategy. If this is the case, 
“these return assessments drive commodity returns and not the index investment activities 
themselves,” and therefore the often recommended limitation on index investment would do 
nothing to stem the information flows and instead just reduce liquidity in these markets.138 
Studies, like Gilbert and Pfuderer’s, that look to expand the more narrowly focused research that 
occurred in the aftermath of the food price crisis has allowed for a more interesting and helpful 
analysis of the crisis.  
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 Rather than trying new research methods to aid in the more insightful analysis of the food 
price crisis, Haase, Zimmermann, and Zimmermann devised a study that reviewed the findings 
of 100 empirical studies looking at some aspect on the impact of speculation on commodity 
futures markets.139 In order to perform this metastudy, empirical findings are separated by focus 
variable that speculation is supposed to have reinforcing effects on, then separated based on the 
different measures of speculation used, and lastly looked at based on paper quality. This study is 
interesting, in that it examines about 100 studies looking at causality, and through synthesizing 
them all together, takes this analysis a step further. Not surprisingly, with respect to the 
individual focus variables for most food commodities they majority of studies do not find a 
systematic speculative impact, yet interestingly, where studies do find speculative effects, they 
predominately identify reinforcing price effects, and are indeterminate on the effects of returns 
and volatility. This relates back to the previously discussed new area of research that looks at the 
possibility that information available to index investors could have driven commodity price 
spikes.140 Again, taking a step back from the idea that speculation drove up commodity prices, 
and looking at the bigger picture to look for drivers of the food price crisis, continued to reveal 
the role information flows might have played in the crisis. 
 Bruno, Büyüksahin, and Robe continued this exploration by looking at the relationship 
between agricultural commodity markets and equity markets, specifically looking at what drives 
the intensity of the linkages between these markets and the possible role this correlation could 
have played in the food price crisis.141 Recent literature has looked at this idea theoretically, but 
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this study is one of the only to take an empirical approach.142 Overall, they found that when 
taking into account “shocks that are idiosyncratic to agricultural markers, [they] find that the 
world business cycle, more than speculative activity, drives co-movements between agricultural 
and financial markets.”143 It should be noted that Granger-causality was not used at any point in 
this study, rather structural vector autoregression was used, which like all econometric tests has 
its limitations, but provides an output subject to different critiques than those from Granger-
causality, allowing for a diversified analysis on the issue.144 While the majority of the recent 
research done has come from traditional academic route of publishing in journals, the large 
international organizations that were first to research the role of institutional investors in the food 
price crisis, have continued some of this research, but quite minimally.  
 While the majority of these groups have turned their research towards newer issues 
surrounding world food concerns, The World Bank followed the recent research trend of 
analyzing the food price crisis in a new light by stepping back and looking at the bigger 
picture.145 The World Bank stepped back from the focused view, and instead looked at what are 
the overall causes of the agricultural price cycle today, as a way to try and assess why the real 
price of food is still 40 percent higher (as of the 2016 publication of this article) than its early 
2000 lows. In their multifaceted analysis of the drivers of the agricultural price movements, they 
found that energy prices mattered most, followed by stock-to-use ratios, which indicate the level 
of carryover stock for a given commodity as a percentage of the total use of the commodity-
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essentially an indicator of supply relative to demand. This study utilized data from 1960-2015 to 
look at these price cycles, and it should be noted that when looking at the importance of energy 
prices on agricultural price movements its heavy influence “applies as much to the pre-2014 high 
energy prices as it does to the post-2014 low energy price environment,” and this 
energy/agriculture link is “not limited to the direct energy costs to agricultural producers, as it 
also affects the relative energy costs between various players in global commodity markets.”146 
This multivariate approach, which widens the scope of price driver evaluation, allows for an 
empirical analysis that can more closely mimic the actual agricultural commodity environment 
by trying to consider the different factors that affect the market. Similar to empirical works like 
this one, that try and take a broader look at price drivers in agricultural markets due to the 
continuing increase in food prices, some academic research has taken a theoretical approach with 
this broadening viewpoint in mind.  
 Similar to the approach of Jennifer Clapp, James Williams takes a holistic look at the 
relationship between finance, food, and farming, however; Williams remains neutral on idea of 
increased agricultural commodity investment driving up prices and rather just focuses on the 
growing relationship between finance and agriculture.147 In exploring this relationship, Williams 
comes to two major conclusions about the exploration of the financialization of food: literature 
has focused too much on the collisions between separate domains, rather than seeing this 
financialization as a form of work where these spheres are working in conjunction with one 
another, and that too often the unevenness, reflected in both the practical contingencies and 
variable outcomes of financialization, is overlooked in literature on the subject. Accounts like 
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this can both help better direct future research to target the areas need further analysis, as well as 
possibly help improve the approach of policy makers/influencers of in regulation of this area.  
Popular Journalism  
 Recently, the financialization of food has not had as much press, as the rising food prices 
have been more steady, unlike the sharp spikes in 2008. However, the still pending legislation 
surrounding commodity position limits has kept the issues surrounding the financialization of 
food a little more relevant in popular press. These pieces have focused on the uncertainty 
surrounding this legislation, since in three votes since 2011, the most recent in December 2016, 
the CFTC has voted to float the position limits rule put in place by Dodd-Frank as a reaction to 
the research/congressional testimony following the food price crisis.  
 Because of the vote to float the rule, media focused on the fact that the Trump 
administration would be in charge of not only deciding how to provide with the position limits 
rule, but also on reshaping the Dodd-Frank legislation as a whole due to the head of the CFTC 
stepping down, and the new administration appointing a replacement. In discussions of the 
position limits rule, the role of increased speculation continued to be mentioned at the culprit for 
the implementation of position limits.148  
 Also, being mentioned in popular press, is the possibility of limits on the amount large 
banks can invest in physical commodities, but requiring much more capital to support these 
investments. While this literature and legislation focuses on physical commodities, rather than 
the derivatives that have been primarily discussed, this further shows the continued skepticism of 
the role of institutional investors in the agricultural sphere, as the purposed regulation could 
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effectively push large banks, like Goldman Sachs and J.P. Morgan, out of the physical 
commodity markets.149  
 The continued relevance of agricultural commodities in popular press credits the 
importance of the effects of agricultural commodity trading to not only academics, but also the 
general population. This continued concern warrants our attention, and especially the attention of 
both policy makers and influencers as this is an area that deserves proper oversight. 
Recommendations as what this future oversight should look like, as well as future research to 
better determine the best policy will be discussion in the following section.      
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Chapter 5: Findings and Conclusions 
Initial Observations: Two Major Research Providers 
 After analyzing the literature surrounding the effects of the deregulation of agricultural 
commodities through the investigation of the food price crisis, I first noticed that while there 
were many different sources of research and discussion, these sources could be generally 
categorized into two different groups: academics and policy influencers/advancers. These groups 
are not distinctive merely because of different types of authors, but more so because of their 
conflicting conclusions.  
 Academics in this case, are individuals that are doing research whose motivations seem to 
be primarily for the advancement of knowledge in this discipline. These authors are generally 
professors at universities with neither ties to the industry, nor apparent sponsorship by possibly 
biased sources. While these authors appear to be more confined to the rigid standards of 
economic research compared to the policy influencers, especially when it comes to thresholds of 
being able to make conclusive statements based on their econometric tests, the seeming lack of 
bias gives these sources an attractive viewpoint.  
 Policy influencers/advancers are a more expansive group of authors. Policy influencers 
includes the research from large international organizations that generally have either a broad 
humanitarian agenda or food policy related mission, as well as US Senate investigations and 
Congressional testimonies. Policy advancers on the other hand, do not actually conduct research 
on the subject, but instead bring the ideas of these policy influencers to the general public, thus 
making popular journalism pieces the primary policy advancers.  
 As stated previously, while these distinctions make sense based on the ability to group 
them through type of author, it is their conclusions that actually create these groups. The broad 
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conclusions of these groups conflict with one another, and only one group has had a major 
impact on agricultural commodity markets, raising the question of the effects of the 
disproportional influence of conflicting ideas. 
Mismatching Conclusions of Two Research Providers 
 Groups like Oxfam, The Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy, and the Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, as well as individuals like Michael Masters who 
testified before Congress overwhelming advocated for the acceptance of the idea that increased 
investment in agricultural commodity derivatives drove up food prices, which resulted in the 
2008 food price crisis. Generally, sources whose research supported this theory would be 
considered policy influencers. Not only are these findings in line with the resulting policy of the 
food price crisis, but these sources are also heavily cited in the reports and investigations done by 
the US government to create policy addressing the food price crisis. Furthermore, the ideas and 
tone of these authors are echoed in most of the popular literature discussing commodity trading 
following the food price crisis. Whether or not intentional, because this popular press was in line 
with the policy influencers, these sources not only advanced these ideas, but also might have 
created a general public more willing to accept the resulting policy because they were unaware 
of the conflicting evidence and theories.          
 Unlike the sources primarily cited in the investigations done by the US government, 
academics were not convinced that increased agricultural commodity derivatives investment 
played a major role in causing the food price crisis. Their research overwhelmingly came to 
conclusions that either showed no causality, or casual evidence that they did not consider 
statistically significant. This was especially true for the academic research that came in the 
immediate aftermath of the food price crisis, while more recent academic research has allowed 
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for a broader expansion of looking at the role of agricultural commodities in food price increases. 
This new research does not confirm the research of the policy influencers, but instead exposes 
other factors surrounding agricultural commodity trading that could be effecting food prices, 
rather than an increase in the volume of investment.  
 The idea that these two types of research providers can be differentiated based solely on 
their conclusions, without regard to their source, is best illustrated by the fact that sometimes an 
academic source and policy influencing source would utilize the same data and preform the same 
test, but come to different conclusions. Examples of this exists in the previous literature analysis 
chapter. For example, a study done by the International Food Policy Research Institute and a 
section of Irwin and Sanders’ testing of the Masters Hypothesis both utilized the CFTC’s 
commitments of traders’ data over about the same time period to run time-series Granger-
causality tests.150 Irwin and Sanders’ data used included all data from the IFPRI study, plus an 
additional 4 agricultural commodities. In their conclusions, the IFPRI supported the perception 
that speculative activity was a major influence in the food price crisis, and additionally that 
speculative activity indicators can affect commodity prices, further confirming the influence of 
speculation on food prices. Unlike the IFPRI, Irwin and Sanders’ interpretation of their results 
did not lead them to the same conclusions. Additionally, Irwin and Sanders used this test as one 
piece of a larger study, which was comprised to multiple econometric tests, to disprove the 
Masters Hypothesis. Both the conclusions from the test that nearly matched that of the IFPRI, 
and Irwin and Sanders’ overall conclusions based on the different econometric tests they 
performed, found no evidence that commodity speculation was a driver of the food price crisis 
spikes. While initially it might seem odd that different conclusions can be drawn from the same 
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data and testing methods, further inquiry reveals a possible explanation for this conundrum: 
differing motivations for research can lead to interpretation biases for both types of research 
providers.  
Motivated Conclusions 
 Putting the causation question of the role of speculative commodity investments in the 
food price crisis aside, examining the possible motivations for the differing conclusions of the 
two research providers brings the vast implications of agricultural commodity regulation to light, 
while also exposing the overly politicized nature of agricultural commodity markets.    
 Research providers providing conclusions that have ulterior motives can be either an 
intentional or a subconscious reaction. The ability of two different researcher providers to draw 
different conclusions based on the same evidence can be explained through unintended 
motivations, justified by the concept of motivated reasoning, a reasoning in the service of some 
self-interest. Because reasoning involves the recruitment and evaluation of evidence, goals can 
distort both of these cognitive processes.151 The distortion of evaluation can possibly be 
explained by Leon Festinger’s theory of cognitive dissonance, where people are motivated to 
reconcile any inconsistences between their actions, attitudes, beliefs, or values. If two beliefs are 
in conflict, or an action contradicts a personal value, the individual experiences an unpleasant 
state that leads to efforts to try and dampen or erase the discrepancy.152 In the case of the two 
research providers, the subconscious attempt to erase the possible discrepancy could lead to an 
evaluative process that leads to an alternate conclusion had the feeling of cognitive dissonance 
not been present.  
																																																						
151 Nicholas Epley and Thomas Gilovich, "The Mechanics of Motivated Reasoning," The Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 30, no. 3 (Summer 2016): 136. 
152 Ibid., 138.  
	 66 
Because the policy influencers typically represent groups with humanitarian missions, 
such as Oxfam’s fight against injustices that cause poverty, or the IFPRIs mission to provide 
policy solutions to sustainably reduce poverty and end hunger, the theory of institutional 
investors being behind the food price crisis would be attractive to this group. Because this cause 
can be remedied through regulation, rather than a cause like natural disasters, which are out of 
human control, groups of this nature would have further incentives to advocate this as a cause, 
given that they can then present solutions that further their missions. With an incentive to believe 
this theory, given that its solutions would align with these groups values, if evidence presented 
itself in contradiction to this theory, they would then try and erase the discrepancy through their 
evaluation of the evidence, thus leading to a different conclusion.  
Academics are also at risk of being subject to cognitive dissonance when evaluating 
evidence, given that their empirical econometric testing must stem from a theoretical model that 
relates to their hypothesis on the issue. Given their initial belief of this hypothesis, cognitive 
dissonance could arise if the test results conflict with their theoretical model, thus providing 
motivation to evaluate the evidence in a way that alleviates this dissonance, and therefore 
validates their initial theory.153   
In addition to cognitive dissonance, academics can have other unintended motives and 
biases in the evaluation of evidence. Because academics are neither tied to missions like many 
NGOs, nor being relied on to fix market issues like the government regulators, they could feel 
less responsible for finding a solution, and thus pigeon hole their analysis to strict economic 
testing that can fail to account for many market factors, or be less willing to look consider 
evidence that while not statistically significantly by their standards, could still have some 
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influence in the market. The unavoidable biases and unintentional motives present on both sides 
of the debate over the possible relationship between increased investment in agricultural 
commodity derivatives and food price increases, begins to unfold the idea that issues surrounding 
agricultural commodity trading go further than its possible role in the food price crisis. Rather, 
because agricultural commodity trading is so closely linked to issues that can result in a life of 
poverty for hundreds of millions of people, while also existing in a complex financial derivatives 
market that is far removed from those fighting poverty and starvation, we can begin to see the 
vast implications of agricultural commodity regulation, and the emergence of a highly politicized 
market. 
Examining researchers whose conclusions could suggest the influence of ulterior motives 
further exposes the politicization of agricultural commodity markets. This is specifically seen 
amidst the individual policy influencers, like Michael Masters and Joseph P. Kennedy II. 
Because Masters’ investments portfolio would benefit from the legislation he testified in favor 
of, and Kennedy’s Citizens Energy Corporation would be more productive if his suggested pure 
speculation ban was put into practice, the possibilities for hidden political agendas within 
research addressing commodity speculation are exposed.  
The conclusions of research providers matching their possible motivations and the 
politicization of agricultural commodity markets are jointly expressed in policy advancing 
popular journalism. Given that these sources echo the ideas of policy influencers, while being the 
primary form of information on agricultural commodity markets to the general population, the 
agendas of those shaping policy more easily enter the public domain, resulting in the possibility 
for smoother reception of the resulting policy. Drawing together these discussed findings, we can 
arrive at an answer to the originally purposed research question.  
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Responding to Purposed Research Question 
Given the intent to explore if the financialization of food that followed the 2000 
deregulation of commodity trading negatively affected agricultural commodity markets, and if 
so, how we can address the negative consequences, the findings of this analysis indicate an 
overall negative effect on agricultural commodity markets, while also providing possible 
recommendations to both directly address the consequences, and direct future research to better 
handle the determined negative consequences.            
The identification of two major providers of research whose conflicting conclusions and 
disproportionate representation in policy can be linked to motivations specific to the source 
helped to expose both the vast implications of agricultural commodity policy and how a highly 
politicized market emerged in the wake of agricultural commodity deregulation. The 
politicization of agricultural commodity markets has negatively affected these markets by 
creating a market whose issues go beyond efficient and effective market activity, and instead has 
created an environment where any issue that can be tied to an agricultural commodity can 
become a focal point in discussions of the effects of agricultural commodity trading, thus 
distracting from the analysis attempting to resolve an issue. Whether this is the debate over best 
econometric testing practices that distract from market analyzation due to these discussions 
focusing on why either the policy influencers or academics are wrong in their chosen tests, 
depending on the source, or academic’s discussed frustrations with their lack of influence in 
policy until after rule have been put in place, as in the positon limits rule lawsuit, it does not feel 
like agricultural commodities are always the focus of research that claims to be assessing their 
role in food price increases. Instead, this research is providing a setting to focus on other agendas 
that can be hidden under the umbrella of agricultural commodities, thus allowing self-serving 
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agendas to hide in a research area where a primary goal of ensuring that market functions are not 
driving people into hunger, is a research goal almost anyone can support. 
The question of causation in the food price crisis aside, the increased investment in 
agricultural commodity derivatives that followed the 2000 deregulation of commodities has 
resulted in hostile market through both the conflicting research that places different market 
participants in contention with one another depending on the research they agree with, and the 
ability to use both the market and research concerning the market to further self-serving agendas. 
What then can we do address these consequences?   
Recommendations 
In reaction to the politicization of the agricultural commodity markets, I believe the 
unbundling of agricultural and non-agricultural commodities could help alleviate some of the 
tensions created by the politicization. While there are many different types of agricultural 
commodity derivate products, the majority are composed of a basket of different types of 
commodities, including agricultural, energy, and metal commodities. Because agricultural 
commodities are more politically sensitive due to their acute impact on the poor, separating them 
from other types of commodities could make financial innovation less risky, as the agricultural 
commodities would be subject to separate regulation that addresses their sensitive nature without 
hindering financial innovation in less vulnerable markets.  
When discussing the financialization of food, putting aside the question of causation in 
the food price crisis allows for a more dynamic and expansive analysis of agricultural 
commodity markets. Rather than focusing on the causation, future research should instead look 
to see if financialization has affected commodity markets through mechanisms that underpin the 
market, explaining a correlation between increased agricultural commodity investment and food 
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price increases through a common cause, rather than one causing the other. Conclusive evidence 
on this idea of correlation though a common cause, rather than the assumed causation, would 
hopefully help lessen the existing tensions in agricultural commodity markets. 
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